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Introduction
It has been nearly twelve years and three United States (U.S.) presidential administrations since the United Nations (UN) coalition overwhelmingly defeated Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Immediately after Iraq's defeat, the first Bush administration unofficially indicated its desire for Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to eventually fall from power-although it made it clear to the American people that it was not a primary U.S. objective or condition to end hostilities. With no definitive strategy to ensure that this eventually happen, the administration, and those to follow, settled upon a policy of containment in an effort to prevent Saddam from rebuilding his military forces, including his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Under the control of the UN, a series of diplomatic, military, and economic constraints were implemented with the ultimate goal of maintaining regional stability. The UN allowed for humanitarian exemptions to this policy in order for Saddam to meet the non-military needs of his people.
The UN policy of containment towards post-Gulf War Iraq has fractured and has been an abysmal failure. The Iraqi regime, under the dictatorial leadership of Saddam Hussein, has significantly rearmed and there is clear evidence that his WMD programs are more advanced now than before the Gulf War-including significant progress made towards development of nuclear armaments. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the U.S., in concert with the UN, take immediate measures to reexamine its containment policy and put in place a renewed UNsponsored WMD inspection regime. If success should continue to elude the U.S. and its allies, they will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive military strike to bring about the long awaited Iraqi regime change, assuring once and for all the destruction of Iraq's WMD.
The first part of the essay that follows will conduct a strategic analysis of the failed policy of containment utilizing the analytical framework of ends, means, and ways. It will begin with a discussion of U.S. national interests and objectives with regard to Iraq-the ends-and the assumptions in the domestic and international environments that influenced their development.
It will continue with an in-depth analysis of the threat-highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion will then turn to the instruments of state power-the means-and how they have been applied-the ways-towards the Iraqi regime since the end of the Gulf War in an effort to achieve the ends. This portion of the discussion will focus on the coercive policy of containment and offer some thoughts as to why it has essentially failed. Finally, the analysis will conclude with a discussion of some of the constraints that impinge upon the U.S.'s ability to have freedom of action in the Gulf region and continue to limit its ability to develop additional policy options. Part one of the essay will conclude with a recommendation for a renewed nonmilitary strategy offered as a potential solution to the current Iraqi dilemma.
The second part of this essay will assume that the previous recommended strategy does not achieve the desired results and that the use of military force will become necessary. A second strategic analysis will be conducted that specifically addresses the impending use of military force. The framework for discussion will focus on the following six key elements: (1) political setting and stated/implied objectives, (2) military strategic setting, (3) military objectives, (4) military capabilities and vulnerabilities, (5) the strategic concept, and (6) potential results.
National Interests, International/Domestic Assumptions, And Objectives
The Bush Administration in the recently released National Security Strategy (NSS), has stated that the U.S. goal for national security strategy "…is to help make the world not just safer but better," and broadly defined three national interests, "…political and economic freedom, War would continue to be required to effectively contain Iraq post-conflict. And fifth, the U.S.
mistakenly believed that it and the allies had knocked out a great majority of the WMD during the war and that which remained was rather limited in scope. 3 Once again and in retrospect, this assumption made by post-war policy makers now appears to have been a poor one.
The Threat
In (down from 500), 140-160 major SAMs (down from 320), 500-700 light SAMs (down from 1,000-1,500), and some 3,000 AAA guns (down from 4,000-6,000). 8 "The six heavy armored and mechanized divisions in the regular army, and the four heavy armored and mechanized divisions in the Republican guard, now have about 65% of the major weapons numbers they had in 1990." 9 In sum, the Iraqi military is still very capable and well trained. The air force can generate several hundred sorties a day for several days and the air defense sector has proven itself very survivable despite numerous attempts to defeat it by the U.S. and the British. Despite
Iraq's relatively "good" condition in terms of conventional weapons, it still suffers from a poorly trained conscript force, many of whom are Shiites and of questionable loyalty. 10 So one would logically ask at this point: is Saddam a threat to the maintenance of regional stability and is he a threat to the world at large? The answer by most Americans would likely be a resounding, "Yes." Saddam's history of aggression, his continued intransigence towards UN weapons inspections despite numerous attempts to seek compliance, and his clear desire to acquire WMD make it clear that he is a threat to peace and stability and must be disarmed.
President George W. Bush in his recent speech in Cincinnati where he outlined the Iraqi threat to the American public stated, " We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten
America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. Since we all agree on this goal, the issues are: how can we best achieve it?"
Means and Ways
Now that the objectives-the ends-and the threat have been clearly stated we turn our attention towards the means and ways-also known as the tools and methods-to achieve those ends. The four fundamental "power tools" that strategists use in formulating policy to achieve national interests are: diplomatic, economic, military, and information. These tools are applied in a number of conceptually different ways and can run the full spectrum from forced military intervention to peace keeping and nation building. The following discussion will focus on one of these broad conceptual applications-containment-how it has been applied to the Iraqi threat since the Gulf War, and why it has begun to show recent signs of failure.
Containment Defined: Containment is a form of denial that requires skillful diplomacy and strong international cooperation to be made effective. Skillfully executed, as it was against the USSR during the Cold War, it can work well in the non-proliferation of WMD.
Iraq has been under the policy of containment since the end of the Gulf War. There are five key elements that blend together to define containment as it applies to Iraq: (1) In order for U.S. post-Gulf War containment policy to work effectively it requires consistent support from the U.S. public, world powers, and key regional allies. Unfortunately, support has steadily waned in recent years and has therefore undermined containment.
Economic sanctions for the most part are meaningless, and they receive increasingly less international support. Also, the UN inspection program has been nonexistent for four years and even when it was allowed to occur, it was less than effective. The threat from Saddam is clear and present. Although Saddam's plans and intentions are unclear, he has demonstrated a propensity to acquire WMD despite world consensus (through the UN) that he disarm. Clearly a new strategy is needed to successfully accomplish our national interests and objectives vis-à-vis Iraq.
Constraints
Before our discuss moves to recommendations for a strategy to meet the threat, we must look at a few constraints that effect U.S. policy development in the Gulf. consensus to legitimatize its policies, by doing so, it often places constraints on its freedom of action. The U.S. must then compromise or soften its policies in an effort to maintain the antiIraq alliance. 20 This concept is playing out in the UN today with France and Russia disagreeing with the U.S. wording on a new UN resolution that will compel Iraq to admit inspectors after a four-year absence. The U.S. may very well find itself having to compromise and tone down its aggressive policy toward Iraq for the sake of maintaining its current coalition.
Recommendations To Meet The Threat
From the preceding strategic analysis, one can easily conclude that the Post-Gulf War 23 This recommended course of action has a good probability of accomplishing a successful regime change without Iraq falling into total chaos and hopefully a regime more favorable than Saddam's.
Use Of Force
The remainder of this essay will assume that the nonmilitary strategy recommended above was implemented but failed in its effort to remove Saddam from power and eliminate his WMD.
The UN inspectors reentered Iraq but were once again faced with continued uncooperative and deceptive Iraqi authorities. Also, the recommended covert operation was unsuccessful because
Saddam's internal security machine was found to be too effective and resistant to any potential military coup. Therefore at this point, there is no choice but to use military force to achieve our stated objectives. What follows is a strategic analysis of the planned war against Iraq. The framework for discussion will focus on the following six key elements: (1) political setting and stated/implied objectives, (2) military strategic setting, (3) military objectives, (4) military capabilities and vulnerabilities, (5) the strategic concept, and (6) potential results.
Political Setting and Stated/Implied Objectives:
The stated political objectives remain the same as were presented earlier in this essay: (1) preventing Iraq from gaining regional influence, particularly over the oil-rich Gulf states; (2) stopping Iraq from building WMD [including ballistic missiles]; (3) removing Saddam from power; and (4) preserving the stability of U.S. allies in the region.
Obviously though, the objective of removing Saddam from power has gained a new sense of urgency. For purposes of this analysis we will assume that the UN Security Council has approved a resolution on the use of force to remove Saddam and to destroy his WMD. Implied in the objective of removing Saddam from power is the requirement to reestablish a viable government within Iraq following the military invasion and Saddam's departure. This new stable government will be essential to maintain stability in the region in the years ahead.
An additional critical consideration in this discussion of political setting is to ascertain Israel's position on whether they would react offensively if they were to be attacked by Iraq.
During the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. led coalition was successful in preventing an Israeli counter-attack following an Iraqi attack by relatively benign conventional Scud missiles.
Attempting to once again gain Israel's neutrality may prove extraordinarily difficult especially if it were to be attacked this time by chemical or biological weapons. This scenario is actually quite possible if Saddam becomes desperate, sees that his survivability is in jeopardy, and realizes he has nothing to lose. The U.S. must recognize that conditions could potentially exist for an uncontrolled escalation i.e. an Israeli nuclear retaliatory response. Therefore, the U.S.
should make every effort before hostilities commence to assure Israel that the U.S. and its allies will do everything possible to eliminate the threat.
Military Strategic Setting:
An important question that needs to be answered in our analysis is whether military operations are appropriate to achieve the stated and implied political objectives given the current and anticipated strategic setting? The answer to this question is "yes," assuming that the U.S. is successful in building an international coalition-one that is in complete agreement that Saddam must be removed from power by using military force. Although the U.S. could "go it alone," possibly with the British by its side, we would be perceived as the aggressors without total coalition support. An international coalition, united in its agreement on what needs to be done, provides legitimacy to the operation. Coalition action will also give the added benefit of offsetting the tremendous costs in terms of material resources and personnel. Although limited in nature, the war must be quick, decisive, and overwhelming.
Military Objectives:
Our stated military objectives are rather obvious and stem from the political objectives earlier defined-(1) removal of Saddam Hussein from power (either dead or alive) and (2) 24 The allied center of gravity on the other hand is the allied coalition itself.
Saddam's aim will be to fracture the coalition either through propaganda that turns the Arab world against the West or through an extensive urban warfare-type war of attrition.
Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:
The essential question that needs to be answered when assessing capabilities and vulnerabilities, is whether the stated and implied military objectives can be achieved with current capabilities or ones that can be brought online in an acceptable timeframe? The bottom line here is that the U.S. and its allies are extraordinarily capable. We've done it before in Iraq and we can do it again. In fact, the U.S. is even more capable now than it was in 1991 during the first Gulf In order to succeed with its objectives, the U.S. and its allies will need to launch an overwhelming combined use of force that capitalizes on all its forces-air, land, sea, space, and SOF. The U.S. and its allies do have vulnerabilities though, and Iraq will without a doubt attempt to capitalize on them. Iraq has no doubt learned much from the last time it fought this formidable force. Iraq realizes that a strategy of annihilation in the open desert is futile and will seek to avoid that scenario. It can be expected that Iraq will attempt to pull the allied ground forces into Baghdad, home to Saddam and his elite Republican Guard forces. This will serve two purposes. It will not only pit Iraq's best forces against the allied forces but it will do so in an urban area vice the open desert. Risk of urban warfare is huge. U.S. forces are ill prepared to face combat in this scenario. They will be forced to go door-to-door to hunt the enemy and there is a tremendous risk for serious, collateral damage and allied/civilian casualties. The media will no doubt capitalize on this desperate situation and could potentially undermine the accomplishment of our military objectives.
Strategic Concept:
This portion of our strategic analysis of the military campaign now looks at whether the strategy contemplated is appropriate for the assumed conduct of the conflict, character of the enemy and the level of resources necessary and available? Allied forces can expect to use a similar strategy that was used in the first Gulf War. Iraq is a relatively well-developed, industrial country that is very susceptible to a well-planned and overwhelming campaign. Iraq will be struck in a manner that air power theorist John Warden termed "strategic paralysis." In the opening hour of the campaign the enemy's "eyes and ears" will be knocked out with an overwhelming, parallel attack on his command and control nodes and air defense sectors.
Simultaneously, allied SOF will be inserted to begin knocking out all known ballistic missile and WMD sites that threaten invading forces and Israel. An extensive air campaign of air interdiction and aerial bombardment will follow; targeting airfields, enemy personnel and their equipment, and critical military industry. Allied forces will quickly win air supremacy and will have reduced considerably the enemy's ability to wage war. Following successful preparation of the battlefield, allied ground forces and close air support will engage the bewildered Iraqi army.
U.S.-trained Iraqi opposition forces, inserted into Iraq at the start of battle for purpose of overthrowing Saddam, will also advance. The Iraqi defeat will soon follow.
Potential Results:
The Cross/Red Crescent, and other Non-Governmental agencies (NGOs) with a stake in the rebuilding of Iraq. Other allied agencies will likely want to participate as well. The U.S. should take the lead (at least initially) in the effort to maintain order and stability. Stabilization forces should also be represented by the UN. A sequenced, logical plan should then be initiated that works towards putting in place a democratically elected leader as a replacement for Saddam.
Extraordinary effort should be made to ensure that all tribal factions within Iraq are represented in this new electoral process. i.e. the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiites., among others.
In addition to stabilizing Iraq, rebuilding key infrastructure nodes that were destroyed during the war, and assisting in the institution of a new government, Iraq's WMD should be completely accounted for and destroyed. Also, assuming Iraq remains committed towards reform, it should be diplomatically recognized within the UN and all economic sanctions and active UN Security Council Resolutions should be rescinded.
Conclusion
This essay described a strategic analysis of the failed policy of containment utilizing the analytical framework of ends, means, and ways. It began with a discussion of the U.S. national interests and objectives with regard to Iraq-the ends-and the assumptions in the domestic and international environments that influenced their development. It then continued with an in-depth analysis of the threat, highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. Discussion then turned to the instruments of state power-the means-and how they have been applied-the ways-towards the Iraqi regime since the end of the Gulf War in an effort to achieve the ends. The policy of containment was then critically examined and some thoughts as to why it has failed were offered.
Finally, analysis concluded with a discussion of some of the constraints that impinge upon the U.S.'s ability to have freedom of action in the Gulf region and that continue to limit its ability to develop renewed policy options. Part one of the essay concluded with a recommended nonmilitary strategy offered as a potential solution to the current Iraqi dilemma.
The second part of this essay assumed that the previously recommended strategy did not achieve the desired results and that the use of military force became necessary. A second strategic analysis was conducted that specifically addressed the impending use of military force.
The six-step military framework was used for the purpose of this analysis. The framework included: Political and military setting, stated/implied political and military objectives, military capabilities and vulnerabilities, strategic concept, and potential results. All elements were analytically discussed in an effort to think through the use of force option before actual hostilities commence.
